Abandoning Women to Their Rights: What Happens When Feminist Jurisprudence Ignores Birthing Rights by Spence, Rebecca A.
THIS ARTICLE ORIGINALLY APPEARED IN – THE CARDOZO JOURNAL OF LAW AND GENDER FALL 2012 VOLUME 19 
NUMBER 1 (DO NOT DELETE) 
 
101 
ABANDONING WOMEN TO THEIR RIGHTS: WHAT 
HAPPENS WHEN FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 
IGNORES BIRTHING RIGHTS 
REBECCA A. SPENCE* 
“An important task of feminist ethics is to . . . offer alternative models for 
medical  relationships that neither replace patient authority with technical expertise 
nor abandon  patients to their ‘rights,’ where that amounts to granting them the 
opportunity to assert  their independent authority in a hostile, frightening 
environment.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Women’s legal rights during childbirth must be addressed as an essential part 
of the range of social justice concerns relevant to women’s lives.  Realizing 
birthing rights requires protecting individual women’s abilities to make healthcare 
decisions free from coercion and discrimination, without abandoning women to 
their rights.2  Beyond individual autonomy in decisionmaking, the spectrum of 
birthing rights includes guaranteeing access to culturally appropriate and supportive 
maternity care, such as independent midwifery, and securing a woman’s freedom to 
give birth safely and with dignity in the location of her choice.  Scholars and 
students3 in the fields of law,4 bioethics,5 anthropology,6 and sociology7 have 
 
* J.D., 2010, University of Maryland School of Law, M.P.H. 2007, University of Virginia. This paper 
was selected as the first place winner of the 2011 National Advocates for Pregnant Women's law student 
writing contest. I wish to thank the staff of NAPW for the inspiration to write this piece and for their 
tireless devotion to protecting the human rights of birthing women. My very special thanks go to Farah 
Diaz-Tello and Jill Arnold for their encouragement and friendship, and to Katie Prown, Renee Cramer, 
and Anne Blackfield for their comments and suggestions. This article is dedicated to the memory of my 
mother, Maureen Sundman Angevine.  
 1 SUSAN SHERWIN, NO LONGER PATIENT: FEMINIST ETHICS AND HEALTH CARE 137 (1992), 
quoted in Karen H. Rothenberg, New Perspectives for Teaching and Scholarship: The Role of Gender in 
Law and Health Care, 54 MD. L. REV. 473, 475 (1995). 
 2 Some commentators have addressed birthing rights issues from the point of view of women’s 
request for intervention in the absence of medical indication. See Sylvia A. Law, Childbirth: An 
Opportunity for Choice that Should Be Supported, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 345 (2008) 
(arguing that cesarean delivery on maternal request should be supported as much as vaginal delivery).  I 
acknowledge the many ways in which women’s lives and health are compromised without access to 
appropriate medical care. Without discounting the importance of this issue or placing normative value 
on fewer medical interventions in childbirth, this paper analyzes the threats posed to birthing rights 
when women seek to give birth without medical intervention or when they refuse medically 
recommended interventions. 
 3 Several student-written pieces have appeared recently focusing on birthing rights. See, e.g., 
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reviewed these issues, yet these studies remain curiously absent from gender 
discrimination and feminist jurisprudence texts commonly used in American law 
schools.8  Childbirth and midwifery are also absent as a distinct subject in the 
Model Curriculum on Reproductive Rights, Law and Justice developed by Law 
Students for Reproductive Justice, a national network that “educates, organizes, and 
supports law students to ensure that a new generation of advocates will be prepared 
to protect and expand reproductive rights as basic civil and human rights.”9  
Meanwhile, women’s rights have been subtly and less-subtly violated by state 
actors—from legislatures and administrative agencies that restrict access to care 
providers, to courts and child welfare authorities that punish women for their 
birthing choices.  As a result, the potential for feminist legal analysis of women’s 
rights in childbirth has not been fulfilled. 
The goals of this Article are twofold.  First, this Article will demonstrate that 
while birthing rights issues have been familiar areas of concern for feminist 
scholarship on women’s rights to privacy and equality, neglecting to integrate this 
work into the law school classroom fails to promote effective legal advocacy for 
pregnant women.  The violation of women’s rights during childbirth is a more 
common problem than reported legal opinions indicate,10 and few lawyers are 
prepared to protect clients prospectively or to vindicate women’s rights post-
childbirth. 
 
Sarah D. Murphy, Labor Pains in Feminist Jurisprudence: An Examination of Birthing Rights, 8 AVE 
MARIA L. REV. 443, 443-71 (2010) (arguing the absence of birthing rights from feminist jurisprudence 
demonstrates a lack of concern in feminism for women’s lived experiences of motherhood, and 
contending this absence is due to the prominence of “radical feminism [a theory] . . . espoused by 
Catherine McKinnon”).  The author believes “to emphasize birthing rights would be to legitimize 
motherhood,” and therefore, birthing rights fail to fit into a perceived feminist agenda. Id. at 470-71; see 
also Krista Stone-Manista, In the Manner Prescribed by the State: Potential Challenges to State 
Enforced Hospital Limitations on Childbirth Options, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 496 (2010); 
Benjamin Grant Chojnacki, Pushing Back: Protecting Maternal Autonomy from the Living Room to the 
Delivery Room, 23 J.L. & HEALTH 45 (2010). 
 4 See, e.g., Nora Christine Sandstad, Pregnant Women and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Feminist 
Examination of the Trend to Eliminate Women’s Rights During Pregnancy, 26 LAW & INEQ. 171 (2008). 
 5 See Rebecca Kukla et al., Finding Autonomy in Birth, 23 BIOETHICS 1 (2009). 
 6 See CHRISTA CRAVEN, PUSHING FOR MIDWIVES: HOMEBIRTH MOTHERS AND THE 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2010). 
 7 See RAYMOND DEVRIES, MAKING MIDWIVES LEGAL: CHILDBIRTH, MEDICINE AND THE LAW (2d 
ed. 1996). 
 8 See KATHERINE T. BARTLETT & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY DOCTRINE, 
COMMENTARY (4th ed. 2006); HERMA H. KAY & MARTHA S. WEST, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX-
BASED DISCRIMINATION (6th ed. 2005); D. KELLY WEISBERG, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (1996). 
 9 Motivation, LAW STUDENTS FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE, http://lsrj.org/history_and_ 
accomplishments/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2012). The model curriculum can be found at 
http://lsrj.org/documents/resources/LSRJ_Model_Curriculum_2d_ed.pdf. The curriculum includes a 
section entitled “General Pregnancy Rights” and “Forced Cesarean Sections,” but does not address the 
issue of women’s rights in childbirth specifically nor does it include any reference to midwives. Model 
Curriculum for courses in Reproductive Rights Law & Justice, LAW STUDENTS FOR REPRODUCTIVE 
JUSTICE 38-40 (2008), http://lsrj.org/documents/resources/LSRJ_Model_Curriculum_2d_ed.pdf. 
 10 See JENNIFER BLOCK, PUSHED: THE PAINFUL TRUTH ABOUT CHILDBIRTH AND MODERN 
MATERNITY CARE (2007). 
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This Article begins with a description of the doctrinal categories of law that 
individual birthing rights implicate, and illustrates, through a discussion of coerced 
and court-ordered cesarean sections, how feminist scholarship has called into 
question whether those protections are equally afforded to pregnant women.  
Detailed analysis will show how various courts have applied or misapplied 
precedent and relied on medical authority to the detriment of a woman’s 
constitutional right to bodily integrity.  The cases discussed below illustrate the 
ways in which violations of women’s birthing rights become evident and 
demonstrate a profound disrespect for women as individuals with equal civil and 
human rights.  These cases also reveal troubling racial and ethnic disparities, as the 
case law has unequally been targeted towards minority women.11 
Second, this Article connects violations of women’s rights in childbirth with 
women’s unequal ability to access maternity care outside of the hospital.  Focusing 
on legislative efforts to increase access to midwives, this Article suggests that the 
interplay between individual affronts to women’s rights and state prohibition of 
midwifery can be a convergence point for future feminist legal scholarship from an 
intersectional perspective.  The Article then analyzes the effect of limiting 
maternity care options for women by discussing the legal status of direct-entry 
midwives and the impact of the legal status of midwives on the women they serve.  
Prohibitions against midwifery are a significant threat to women’s birthing rights 
because they make access to care more difficult and because legal restrictions 
against midwifery are emblematic of violations of birthing rights in general.  
Failure to address these interconnected and interdependent issues in the classroom 
represents a tremendous missed opportunity, at the very least because 
approximately eighty-five percent of women will carry a pregnancy to term and 
give birth at some point during their reproductive lives.12 
PUTTING RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: MATERNITY CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 
The United States is one of the highest spenders of all industrialized countries 
on healthcare.  In 2008, healthcare costs amounted to about 16.2% of the nation’s 
gross domestic product.13  Most births in the United States occur in hospitals.  
 
 11 See Veronica E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1192, 1193 (1987) (reporting the results of a national survey on court-ordered interventions, in 
which 81% of respondents were non-white women and 24% of respondents were women for whom 
English was not their primary language); see also Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 
DUKE L.J. 492 (1993) (analyzing the fact that courts have been willing to coercively intervene in certain 
women’s reproductive lives as a power struggle over the control of reproduction and the meaning of 
motherhood). 
 12 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE 
PRECONCEPTION HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE — UNITED STATES: A REPORT OF THE CDC/ATSDR 
PRECONCEPTION CARE WORK GROUP AND THE SELECT PANEL ON PRECONCEPTION CARE (2006), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr5506.pdf. 
 13 Background Brief: U.S. Healthcare Costs, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, 
http://www.kaiseredu.org/Issue-Modules/US-Health-Care-Costs/Background-Brief.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2012). 
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However, in 2006, there were 38,568 out-of-hospital births in the United States, 
including 24,970 home births, and 10,781 births occurring in freestanding birthing 
centers.14 With over 4.2 million births in 2008, pregnancy and delivery is the most 
common reason for hospitalization, and about thirty percent (1.4 million) of births 
occur by cesarean section.15  Maternity care is a major cost to both private and 
public health care payers, including twenty-six percent of costs to Medicaid and 
thirty-five percent of charges billed to private insurance companies.16  For many 
women, the experience of pregnancy and childbirth is their first experience as a 
patient within the health care system.  For the high cost of modern maternity care in 
the United States, the outcomes for women and babies are comparatively poor,17 
disproportionately so for women and children of color.18 
Law has the power to preserve the status quo, and it also has the ability to 
play a part in improving the maternity care that women receive and healthcare 
outcomes.  A question for feminist legal scholars and feminists working in 
women’s health, therefore, is how law can work towards achieving justice for 
birthing women.19 
I. RIGHTS AND CHILDBIRTH 
The right to bodily integrity is protected as a fundamental right under the 
penumbra of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.20  The law has 
extended this right to healthcare situations through the doctrine of informed consent 
and its corollary, informed refusal.21  Professor B. Jessie Hill observes that there 
are two distinct lines of constitutional doctrine related to the right to make health 
care decisions,22 which serve as a framework to connect the discussion of 
individual women’s decisions about healthcare during pregnancy with the 
 
 14 Marian  F. MacDorman, et al., Trends  and  Characteristics  of  Home  and  Other  Out-of-
Hospital  Births  in  the  United  States, 1990–2006, NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS (2010), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_11.PDF. 
 15 U.S. Maternity Care Facts and Figures, CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION, http://www. 
childbirthconnection.org/article.asp?ck=10621. 
 16 Id. The data reports that the average payment for vaginal childbirth in the United States exceeds 
$8,000, for cesarean birth, the payment exceeds $13,000. Id. 
 17 According to Amnesty International, a woman in the United States has a greater lifetime risk of 
dying during pregnancy or birth than women in 40 other countries. Amnesty International, Deadly 
Delivery: The Maternal Healthcare Crisis in the USA 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/dignity/pdf/DeadlyDelivery.pdf. 
 18 Id. (documenting poor outcomes and barriers to care for minority women, undocumented 
immigrant women, and women who rely on Medicaid for health care coverage). 
 19 See Dawn Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing Women’s 
Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569 (1992). 
 20 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (finding that the state cannot force a suspect in a 
criminal case to have his stomach pumped), cited in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 
(1997). 
 21 Nan Hunter, Rights Talk and Patient Subjectivity: The Role of Autonomy, Equality, and 
Participation Norms, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1525, 1528 (2010) [hereinafter, Hunter, Rights Talk]. 
 22 B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two 
Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 277-78 (2007). 
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discussion of state regulation of midwifery.  Hill’s thesis deals with patients’ rights 
to affirmatively choose treatments from effective—but not legally recognized—
options.  She describes two lines of cases in constitutional law: the public-health 
line, which emphasizes “the police power of the state over individual rights,” and 
the autonomy line, which emphasizes “individual bodily integrity and dignity 
interests.”23  She notes that while the cases have developed in parallel, “appearing 
to represent airtight doctrinal categories,” they actually interpret the same 
fundamental question of “whether an individual has a constitutional right to protect 
her health by making autonomous decisions about medical treatment.”24  Birthing 
rights have never reached the Supreme Court, but state courts have likewise dealt 
with the individual rights and public health aspects of birth in these categories.  Hill 
concludes, as this Article similarly finds, that the “constitutional right to protect 
one’s health should be consistently recognized; that the recognition of this right 
should not be artificially limited by excessive deference to . . . findings of medical 
fact; and that this right will have to be carefully balanced against the state’s real 
and legitimate interest” in regulating public health.25  In considering the ways in 
which reproductive justice strives to protect individual and collective women’s 
rights in childbirth, Hill’s insight highlights the false separation between public 
health and autonomy.26 
A. Informed consent and informed refusal of medical treatment 
The origin of informed consent and informed refusal in American common 
law finds its home in the nineteenth and early-twentieth century tort law of battery.  
The tort of battery consists of intentionally causing harmful or offensive contact 
with the person of another, regardless of whether harm is ultimately caused.27  The 
 
 23 Id. at 278. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 282. Hill’s paper compares the Supreme Court’s and federal courts’ decisions related to 
medical marijuana and “partial-birth” abortions.  Hill’s framework explicitly assumes that a “doctor and 
patient have agreed on a particular course of treatment that . . . is prohibited by law.” Id. at 345 n.16. 
 26 According to Hill’s framework, Jacobson v. Mass. represented the first of the “public health” 
line of cases emphasizing police power over individual rights. Hill, supra note 22, at 297-98 (“[T]he 
liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not 
import and absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from 
restraint.” (quoting Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905)).  Hill discusses the Court’s decision 
to exclude the plaintiff’s evidence of the potential harm of vaccinations which closely parallels some 
courts’ decisions to disregard or downplay evidence women present in defense of their birthing choices 
or supporters of midwifery present in defense of midwives and/or access to midwifery practice.  The 
reasoning in Jacobson has been specifically used to restrict reproductive liberties in Buck v. Bell, where 
the court stated that “[t]he principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover 
cutting the Fallopian tubes[.]” Id. at 300 (quoting Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)). The 
autonomy line of cases begins with Griswold v. Connecticut and the right to protect one’s own health by 
making autonomous medical treatment decisions by recognizing individual dignity interests. Id. at 312. 
 27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. c (2006) (“[T]he plaintiff’s grievance consists in 
the offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and intentional invasion of the inviolability of his 
person and not in any physical harm done to his body . . . [and] it is not necessary that the plaintiff’s 
actual body be disturbed.”). 
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Unites States Supreme Court began to articulate this protection for the first time in 
Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, in 1891, where the Court found that: 
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common 
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his 
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear 
and unquestionable authority of law . . .  To compel any one, and especially 
a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit it to the touch of a stranger, 
without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass. 28 
As the doctrine expanded to the context of the physician-patient relationship, 
Justice Cardozo, then serving on the New York Court of Appeals, found that 
“[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without 
his patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”29  
Scholars have cited this case as “early evidence for the women’s health 
movement,” and a “protofeminist departure point for resistance of women patients 
to a broad range of misogynist practices in later decades[,]” in part because the case 
involved a woman who underwent a hysterectomy without her consent.30 
The informed consent doctrine reflects the dominant value placed on bodily 
autonomy, and it introduced the idea of the patient as a rights-bearing subject in 
American jurisprudence.31  The concept of informed consent has evolved to 
include a positive physician-centered duty sounding in negligence, rather than 
battery, requiring doctors to provide patients with information critical to decision 
making.32  Courts have determined that a physician must give the patient the 
information necessary to understand the consequences of a medical decision, the 
risks and benefits of the proposed treatment, and the alternatives, including the 
alternative of doing nothing.33  Depending on the jurisdiction, some courts adopt a 
physician-centered standard, which is based on what information a reasonable 
physician would provide, while others take a patient-centered approach, requiring 
 
 28 Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1891) (holding that the circuit court 
has no power to compel a woman who is the plaintiff in a personal injury action to submit to a surgical 
examination as to the extent of her injury sued for without her consent). The language in this statement 
suggests that there is a unique level of gender-specific indignity experienced by a woman forced to 
receive treatment. 
 29 Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (finding that a physician could be 
liable for operating on a patient who had consented only to examination). 
 30 Hunter, Rights Talk, supra note 21, at 1531. 
 31 Id. at 1529. For a discussion about the development of informed consent in law and ethics, see 
RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986). 
According to Hunter, extensive historical analysis of this subject remains to be done, and would include 
the influence of movements such as the right-to-die campaigns, the disability rights movement, and 
others. Hunter, Rights Talk, supra note 21, at 1549 n.13. 
 32 Jamie Staples King & Benjamin Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case for Shared 
Medical Decision Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 437 (2006). 
 33 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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doctors to provide information that a reasonable patient would deem necessary.34  
The emphasis on a patient’s understanding and appreciation of the options 
underscores the belief that the patient—rather than the doctor—is in the best 
position to determine which risks she will accept,35 and represents an important 
integration of the concept of autonomy in the common law of informed consent.36 
Courts have upheld a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment, even when 
the refusal will lead to the death of another person.37  In an oft-quoted articulation, 
a Pennsylvania court refused to compel a man to submit to a bone marrow 
transplant in order to save the life of his cousin, who was dying of leukemia.38  
Such an order would “change every concept and principle upon which our society 
is founded.  To do so would defeat the sanctity of the individual, and would impose 
a rule which would know no limits[.]”39  The court noted that the man’s refusal 
was morally indefensible, but legally could not be overridden because he was under 
no legal duty to rescue another person.40 
The Constitution likewise protects informed refusal of unwanted medical 
procedures.  The Supreme Court held that an individual maintains a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in refusing treatment, even when her life is at risk.41  As 
with many other constitutional protections, however, the right to refuse medical 
treatment is not absolute, as it can be weighed against state interests.42  The state 
may weigh the individual’s liberty interest against its own interests in preventing 
homicide and suicide, protecting innocent third parties, maintaining the ethical 
integrity of the medical profession, and preserving human life.43  In the context of 
an individual’s right to consent to medical treatment, and surgery in particular, the 
Supreme Court has emphasized that risk to the patient weighs heavily against the 
interest of the state, as does the extent of the intrusion and the reason the state seeks 
to intrude.44  In cases where an individual’s decision to accept or to refuse 
treatment impacts only the individual person, courts have taken an extremely 
 
 34 King & Moulton, supra note 33, at 438. For a discussion of the foundational cases under each 
standard, see id. at 439-47. 
 35 See Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered 
Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951, 1969 (1986). 
 36 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 31, at 43. 
 37 McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1978). 
 38 Id. at 91. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); but see Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 
166 (2003) (holding that the state may force defendants awaiting trial to receive antipsychotic drugs if 
the treatment is medically appropriate and the defendant is dangerous). 
 42 See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (weighing the individual’s interest in privacy 
and bodily integrity against society’s interest in conducting the procedure, and holding the Fourth 
Amendment protected the robbery suspect from being forced to undergo surgery to remove a bullet that 
could be used as evidence against him). 
 43 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282. 
 44 Winston, 470 U.S. at 761 (holding the surgery and its attendant risks were overly intrusive and 
therefore, those risks outweighed the state’s interest in obtaining evidence of a crime). 
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cautious approach to permitting forced medical treatment.  However, as will be 
shown below, pregnancy sometimes invokes a separate set of rules. 
B. Birthing Rights Violations: Illustrative Cases 
Feminist scholars have argued that depriving women of their rights during 
pregnancy deprives women of legal personhood,45 diminishes women’s autonomy, 
and derogates women’s claim to full citizenship.46  Nevertheless, many courts have 
deprived women choosing between different modes of delivery of their rights to 
informed consent and refusal by over-relying on evidence from medical providers, 
and by misapplying abortion law to women not seeking abortions.  This Section 
deals with several instances of court-ordered intervention during childbirth that 
have appeared in reported cases in the United States since the early 1980s. 
Courts have generally taken one of two approaches in resolving the matters.  
One approach involves an explicit balancing of a woman’s rights against an 
asserted state interest in the fetus.47 Under the second approach, courts analyze 
whether or not pregnancy diminishes a competent adult’s right to refuse medical 
treatment even in life-threatening emergencies.48  Using the first approach, courts 
rely upon a state interest in fetal life based on the holding of Roe v. Wade,49 despite 
the fact that Roe declined to acknowledge a state interest in fetal life except insofar 
as to permit states to regulate abortion.50  In nearly all cases where a balancing test 
is applied, the state’s interest in the fetus is found to trump the woman’s liberty- or 
privacy-based right to refuse the recommended medical care.  Women prevail only 
when courts find that a pregnant woman, like any other adult, is protected in her 
right to determine the medical care she wishes to receive. 
The first example of the balancing strategy can be seen in the case of Jessie 
Mae Jefferson, who was court-ordered to submit to a cesarean section after she 
refused on religious grounds.51  Two concurring opinions demonstrate the judicial 
approach to the decision as a balancing between the woman’s right to refuse 
surgery for herself, and the state’s interest in protecting fetal life: one judge 
affirmed that “the power of a court to order a competent adult to submit to surgery 
is exceedingly limited.  Indeed, until this unique case arose, I would have thought 
 
 45 Dawn Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women’s Constitutional Rights to 
Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 620 (1986). 
 46 April Cherry, Roe’s Legacy: The Nonconsensual Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women and 
Implications for Female Citizenship, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 723, 725 (2006). 
 47 See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 457 (Ga. 1981); In re 
A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1249, 1254, 1259 (D.C. 1990). 
 48 See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d. 1235, 1245-46 (D.C. 1990); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 
326, 401 (Ill. App. 1994). 
 49 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973) (demonstrating that personhood status for the fetus is 
not necessary to erode women’s rights in childbirth). 
 50 Id.; Cherry, supra note 46. 
 51 Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457. 
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such power to be nonexistent.”52  However, the court concluded that the right to 
refuse treatment is not enjoyed by an “expectant mother in the last weeks of 
pregnancy.”53 
In the Jefferson case, Georgia’s child protective service agency petitioned for 
temporary custody of the fetus as “a deprived child without proper parental care.”54  
Relying on Roe v. Wade, the court reasoned that since it would be a crime to abort 
the fetus in Georgia, it was “appropriate to infringe upon the wishes of the mother 
to the extent . . . necessary to give the child an opportunity to live.”55  The court 
granted the order to carry out the surgery, concluding that a viable human being—
i.e., the fetus—was entitled to state protection.56 
Following this approach, a court ordered cesarean surgery in a 1986 case of a 
nineteen-year-old first time mother in Washington, D.C.57  The woman, Ms. 
Madyun, and her husband arrived at D.C. General Hospital, where a physician 
recommended an immediate cesarean, citing an increased risk of infection with 
each hour after the water breaks.58  The woman’s water had been broken for 
seventy hours.  Madyun understood the increased risk of infection, but refused the 
surgery because there were no objective indications that she or her fetus was in 
distress.59  When the hospital petitioned the court to order the surgery, Madyun and 
her husband were represented by counsel and the fetus was appointed a guardian ad 
litem in an emergency hearing.60  The couple cited their religious belief that, in the 
Muslim faith, women decide what risks are appropriate to take for themselves and 
their babies in childbirth.61  The physician requesting the order testified that there 
was a 50-75% risk of sepsis if the fetus was not delivered immediately; in contrast, 
 
 52 Id. at 460. 
 53 Id. (citing Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J.), cert. 
denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964)) (holding that a woman pregnant with a viable fetus had no right to refuse a 
life-saving blood transfusion).  The court in Anderson found that “because the welfare of the child and 
mother are so intertwined and inseparable [it] would be impracticable to attempt to distinguish between 
them.” Anderson, 201 A.2d at 538. 
 54 Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 460. 
 55 Id. at 458. 
 56 Id. at 459. 
 57 Cynthia Gorney, Whose Body is it, Anyway? The Legal Maelstrom That Rages When The Rights 
of Mother and Fetus Collide, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 1988), available at http://www.highbeam.com/ 
doc/1P2-1295209.html. 
 58 Id. Madyun and her husband first attended Greater Southeast Community Hospital and were 
turned away for lack of insurance.  This case occurred the year that the Emergency Medical Treatment 
and Active Labor Act, a federal law prohibiting hospitals from turning away women in active labor, was 
enacted in 1986. Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 In re Madyun, 114 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. 2233 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1986).  Ayesha Madyun was not 
represented as herself, but as one of the parents of Fetus Madyun. The opinion notes that Mr. Madyun 
was given the opportunity to consent to the surgery, and also refused. Id.  The opinion of Superior Court 
Judge Richard A. Levie in In re Madyun also appears as an Appendix to In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 app. 
(D.C. 1990). 
 61 Id. 
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if the fetus was delivered immediately, the risk to the woman was only 0.25%.62 
Citing Roe v. Wade and Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding, the Madyun court 
asserted that the state’s “important and legitimate” interest in the potentiality of 
human life becomes compelling at the time of viability. 63  Further, the court found 
that the law affecting the state’s power to protect a child already born applied to 
these facts because the pregnant woman was at term and ready to deliver.64  The 
court noted: 
All that stood between the Madyun fetus and its independent existence, 
separate from its mother, was, put simply, a doctor’s scalpel. . . .  It is one 
thing for an adult to gamble with nature regarding his or her own life; it is 
quite another when the gamble involves the life or death of an unborn 
infant.65 
The judge took notice of the apparent “sincer[ity]” of the Madyuns’ religious 
beliefs, but asserted that their “stronger [reason]” for refusing the surgery was their 
opinion that other measures could be taken to encourage spontaneous delivery.66  
The court refused to “ignore the undisputed opinion of a skilled and trained 
physician to indulge the desires of the parents.”67  Given the “significant” risk to 
the fetus and the “minimal” risks to Madyun, the cesarean was ordered.68  The 
deference to one physician’s opinion to the exclusion of the pregnant woman’s 
expressed needs and beliefs demonstrates the court’s unabashed preference for 
medical knowledge. 
Soon after, courts began to adopt the second approach for resolving hospital 
requests to compel women to undergo cesarean surgery.  In an en banc decision, 
vacating a lower court order, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that the medical 
decisions of a pregnant woman could not be overridden, even if a viable fetus 
would be harmed by the choice.69  In that case, a woman was twenty-six weeks 
pregnant when her doctors discovered terminal cancer, and she was expected to live 
only a few days.  The hospital sought the court’s counsel to determine what should 
be done, fearing litigation if no effort was made to preserve the life of the fetus.70  
 
 62 Although the physician testified that an immediate cesarean posed a 0.25% risk to the woman, 
the opinion does not indicate the nature of the potential harm to the woman.  Id. 
 63 In re A.C., 573 A.2d app. at 1262 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 1262-63. 
 66 Id. at 1263. 
 67 Id. (citing Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (“Parents may be free to become martyrs 
themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their 
children[.]”). The record also indicates that the physician was a resident; there is no evidence of a 
second opinion from an experienced supervisor. Id. at 1261. 
 68 Id. at 1264. 
 69 In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990). 
 70 See Margaret Diamond, Echoes From Darkness: The Case of Angela C., 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 
1061 (1990) for a detailed factual account of the case of In re A.C. The fact that the hospital, rather than 
the treating physicians, initiated the court order, shows that the patient-physician relationship in modern 
medicine must be understood as part of an institutional health care system. 
SPENCE_Abandoning Women_FORMATTED.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/13  2:10 PM 
2012] IGNORING BIRTHING RIGHTS 111 
At a hearing that occurred in the hospital the next morning, Carder and her fetus 
were represented separately.71  Physicians testified that the woman would not 
survive surgery and the fetus was given a fifty-to-sixty percent chance of 
survival.72  The woman and her family opposed surgery given these odds; 
nevertheless the order was granted.73  In an emergency appellate panel held over 
the telephone, the attorney for the hospital argued that “unintended consequences 
on the mother” are “insignificant in respect to the mother’s very short life 
expectancy.”74  Surgery was performed and the baby survived for two hours.  
Carder survived the surgery and regained consciousness long enough to learn of the 
court order and the death of her child, and then she died a few days later.75 
The court found that the right to forgo medical treatment is of constitutional 
magnitude, and involves a right to bodily integrity that is “not extinguished simply 
because someone is ill, or even at death’s door[,]”76 or, importantly, even when that 
person is pregnant.  The en banc decision rejected the lower court’s finding that the 
fetus was an innocent third party entitled to the state’s protection.77  Instead, the 
court cited McFall v. Shimp to support the notion that there is no general legal duty 
to rescue, and, furthermore, that “a fetus cannot have rights . . . superior to those of 
a person who has already been born.”78  In addition to the critical recognition of the 
strength of a woman’s liberty interest during pregnancy, two policy reasons 
supported the decision: first, the American Public Health Association’s argument 
that coerced treatment would erode the trust between women and doctors and drive 
high-risk women out of the health care system; and second, the procedural 
shortcomings in such time sensitive circumstances do not allow adequate ability for 
the woman to organize a defense.79 
Four years later, an Illinois appellate court’s decision indicated that perhaps 
the In re A.C. decision would signal the end of courts’ implementation of balancing 
tests used to determine whether a court can override a competent woman’s refusal 
of cesarean surgery.  In In re Baby Boy Doe, the court held that a woman’s decision 
not to undergo a cesarean section must be honored, despite potential harm to a 
viable fetus.80  Tabita Bricci, a 22-year-old immigrant from Romania,81 was 35 
weeks pregnant when her physician recommended immediate delivery via cesarean 
 
 71 In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1239 (D.C. 1990). 
 72 Id.  Carder’s physician also testified that she had approximately twenty-four hours to live, no 
matter what else was done. Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Diamond, supra note 70, at 1065. 
 75 Id. at 1062, 1066. 
 76 In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1247 (D.C. 1990). 
 77 Diamond, supra note 70, at 1066-67. 
 78 In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1244. 
 79 Id. at 1248. Over thirty amicus briefs were filed with the court. See Diamond, supra note 70, 
1095 n.5. 
 80 In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 401 (Ill. App. 1994). 
 81 Tracy Shryer, Woman at Center of Dispute Gives Birth, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1993. 
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section or induction of labor.82  She refused on religious grounds, stating that her 
Pentecostal Christian faith instructed her to deliver vaginally.83  The hospital and 
the doctor sought a court order to compel immediate surgical delivery, first by 
seeking wardship of the fetus, and then by seeking to appoint a guardian to 
Bricci.84  The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari several months later.85 
In Baby Boy Doe, the Illinois appellate court considered the various legal 
frameworks under which forced treatment decisions could be made.  First, the court 
cited an absolute right to refuse medical treatment under Illinois common law.86  
Turning to the question of duty, the court noted that “[a] woman is under no duty to 
guarantee the mental and physical health of her child at birth, and thus cannot be 
compelled to do or not do anything merely for the benefit of her unborn child.”87  
The court used the rationale that “a woman’s right to refuse invasive medical 
treatment, derived from her rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and religious liberty, 
is not diminished [by] pregnancy,” and “the woman retains the same right to refuse 
invasive treatment, even of lifesaving or other beneficial nature, that she can 
exercise when she is not pregnant[]” because “[t]he potential impact upon the fetus 
is not legally relevant.”88 
While it explicitly reinforced the right of a pregnant woman to refuse 
treatment even when it would save the life of her fetus, the Baby Boy Doe court 
engaged in an analysis of the level of risk that was acceptable to compel 
treatment.89  The court firmly decided that Illinois courts must not engage in a 
balancing of interests of the type seen in Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding.  The court 
cited Cruzan to uphold Bricci’s due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment 
to refuse unwanted medical treatment, stating that the Jefferson court had either 
failed to recognize or failed to appreciate the magnitude of the constitutional 
 
 82 In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 327. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id.  The State later withdrew its petition for wardship. Id. at 330. 
 85 Id. (cert. denied 510 U.S. 1168 (1994)). 
 86 In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 330. 
 87 Id. at 332. 
 88 Id. at 401 (citing Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that 
a fetus had no cause of action against its mother for prenatal injuries, and that only a legislature could 
make such a profound change to the law)).  For a detailed analysis of this case and a comparative 
discussion of court-ordered cesareans in the United Kingdom, see SHEENA MEREDITH, POLICING 
PREGNANCY: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF OBSTETRIC CONFLICT (2005).  When faced with similar cases, 
British courts have ruled that all competent individuals, regardless of pregnancy status, have an absolute 
right to refuse surgery for any reason or for no reason at all.  This is the analysis that gender justice 
requires if women are to be free and equally autonomous decision makers over their own bodies, lives, 
and health; however, it is rare for American courts not to demand women’s reasons for their 
reproductive decisions. Id.  See also Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman: Availability and 
Culpability in Reproductive Health Jurisprudence, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 144 (2010) (discussing 
cases in which the judges appear to blame women for the lack of available reproductive health services 
or procedures, including physicians who would attend them in the birth they desire). 
 89 In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326. 
SPENCE_Abandoning Women_FORMATTED.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/13  2:10 PM 
2012] IGNORING BIRTHING RIGHTS 113 
questions at hand.90  However, the Baby Boy Doe court left open the possibility 
that “relatively non-invasive and risk-free procedure[s],” such as blood 
transfusions, might be compelled consistently with its holding.91  It seemed from 
this court’s opinion that the magnitude of the constitutional interest may be related 
to the magnitude of the intervention and the risk to the woman as opposed to the 
fetus. 
As we have seen, courts need no help deferring to the analysis and 
distribution of risk presented by a physician or hospital.  One reason may be that 
the hearings are conducted with inadequate procedural due process: over the 
telephone, at the bedside of laboring woman, often without representation, and with 
the woman unable to retain counsel or mount a thorough defense of her legal 
rights.92  However, if courts fail to recognize the constitutional magnitude of a 
woman’s rights, they maintain this deference to physician opinion, even when the 
woman appears with her own experts. 
For example, in 1996, a civil rights lawsuit ensued after a sheriff was 
dispatched to drag the laboring Laura Pemberton from her home to undergo a 
court-ordered cesarean.93  Pemberton filed an action against state for violations of 
her constitutional rights, for false imprisonment, and for medical malpractice, but 
the court found no constitutional violations.94  Using Roe v. Wade as its authority, 
the court rejected the claimed violations of substantive and procedural rights under 
the First, Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.95 
The court noted that Ms. Pemberton’s desire only to avoid a “certain 
procedure” for giving birth, rather than complete avoidance of childbirth altogether, 
justified the invasion of her bodily integrity.96  Furthermore, the court did not 
ascertain the legal relevance of which party should be responsible for evaluating 
 
 90 Id. at 331. 
 91 Id. at 333.  The court answered this question in the negative several years later.  In re Fetus 
Brown, 689 N.E.2d. 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that compelling a blood transfusion was 
inconsistent with a pregnant woman’s liberty interests). 
 92 In Burton v. Florida, a judge wrote in his concurring opinion, “the proceeding below violated 
Samantha Burton’s constitutional right to appointed counsel in this case. Accordingly, I would reverse 
on these constitutional grounds as well.” 49 So.3d 263, 266 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.  2010) (Van 
Nortwick, J., concurring). 
 93 See BLOCK, supra note 10, at 249. The court notes that she and her husband left the hospital 
“surreptitiously” against medical advice. Id. 
 94 Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr. Inc., 66 F.Supp.2d. 1247, 1250 (N.D. Fla. 
1999).  At the initial hearing where a state court judge authorized the procedure, Pemberton did not have 
a lawyer present, demonstrating the problems with ensuring due process protections for bedside court 
orders of cesarean surgery. Id. 
 95 Id. at 1251. According to the court, the state’s compelling interest in the life of the fetus under 
Roe permits a state to force woman in the third trimester of pregnancy “to bear a child she does not 
want[.]” Id. at 1252 n.9.  Therefore, “whatever the scope of Ms. Pemberton’s personal constitutional 
rights in this situation, they clearly did not outweigh the interests of the State of Florida in preserving the 
life of the unborn child.” Id. 
 96 Id. at 1253. The court characterized Pemberton’s case as “extraordinary and overwhelming[.]” 
Id. at 1254. It was the sort of case to which the In re A.C. court had left the door open for possible 
coercive action. Id. at 1257 n.18. 
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and deciding between risks of surgery and risks of a poor outcome if surgery were 
avoided.97  Pemberton presented her own account of the risk of foregoing the 
recommended cesarean, which the court decried as “bravado” in presenting 
evidence contrary to the hospital physicians. 98  Although plaintiff’s evidence was 
given by Dr. Marsden Wagner, an international expert on childbirth and a former 
director of maternal-child health at the World Health Organization, the court 
characterized this as the “rhetoric” of an “advocate.”99 
Misuse of abortion-related precedent and extreme deference to physician 
opinion continues to put birthing women’s rights in peril.  In 2009, a Florida court 
forced a Samantha Burton to comply with medical orders for bed rest and to 
eventually undergo a cesarean.100  Burton was in her twenty-fifth week of 
pregnancy and wanted to leave the hospital in order to seek a second opinion after a 
doctor had ordered bed rest for the remaining fifteen weeks of gestation.  When she 
appealed the decision, an appellate court held that the appropriate test to overcome 
a woman’s right to refuse medical intervention during pregnancy is whether the 
state’s interest is sufficient to override her constitutional right to the control of her 
person.101 
The appellate court decided that the state had not met the necessary threshold 
showing of a state interest sufficient to trigger the balancing test;102 that is, the 
state did not show that the fetus was viable.103  As the state had made no such 
showing, balancing was not employed and Burton prevailed.  The court also 
concluded that the state would have to show that the proposed method for pursuing 
the compelling state interest is “narrowly tailored in the least intrusive manner 
possible to safeguard the rights of the individual.”104  If, as in many cases of 
compelled treatment for childbirth, the pregnant woman has little or no due process 
and no legal representation, once the balancing stage is reached, the definition of 
“narrowly tailored” and “least intrusive manner” could be entirely left to whatever 
the physician or hospital presents to the court. 
While the Burton court ultimately ruled in favor of the pregnant woman, the 
case was not a victory for birthing rights.  In fact, the decision left several questions 
unanswered, perhaps even putting women’s rights in more serious peril by 
returning to the flawed reliance on Roe v. Wade to define the state interest, just as 
the courts did in Jefferson and Pemberton.  The amicus brief filed by the American 
 
 97 See generally id. 
 98 Id. at 1252. 
 99 Id. at 1257 n.15. 
 100 Burton v. Florida, 49 So.3d 263, 266 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.  2010).  The compelled cesarean 
nevertheless resulted in a stillbirth—demonstrating that despite deference to medical opinion, the 
desired outcomes are not always achieved. 
 101 Id. (rejecting the best interest of the child standard). 
 102 Id. at 264. 
 103 Id. at 265-66. 
 104 Id. at 266 (citing In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990)). 
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Civil Liberties Union and the American Medical Women’s Association did not 
distinguish the holdings of Roe and its successors, none of which establish a state 
interest in a fetus outside of the context of prohibiting abortion.105  The brief cited 
the Roe line of cases for the proposition that the Supreme Court “has repeatedly 
protected a woman’s constitutional right to make independent medical decisions 
related to her pregnancy, including, ultimately, the choice whether to continue a 
pregnancy.”106  The amici also urged the court to distinguish Burton from 
Pemberton based on their facts, rather than offering a correct characterization to 
clarify what a state interest in fetal life properly consists of, and why that interest is 
inadequate to override the woman’s right to bodily integrity through informed 
refusal.107  If birthing women are to prevail against courts seeking to substitute 
their judgment for women’s constitutional rights, feminist jurisprudence must build 
to teach students a nuanced analysis of how birthing rights can be distinguished 
from abortion.  Without serious attention to this question in feminist jurisprudence 
courses, casebooks, and elsewhere, women will continue to be abandoned to 
exercise their rights in extremely hostile environments.108 
To feminists already concerned with birthing rights, these observations are 
not new.  Scholars have been writing and thinking for decades about how women’s 
relationship to the state is altered by pregnancy and childbirth, especially when the 
state forces women to accept treatment they do not want or fails to make available 
the means by which women can make decisions about their reproductive lives.109  
Nevertheless, courts have not caught up, and meanwhile, ever more hostile 
legislation that may have the effect of controlling the bodies and lives of pregnant 
women, such as fetal personhood laws, has been introduced.110  Violations of the 
 
 105 Burton v. Florida, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 13, 2010), available at http:// 
www.aclu.org/reproductive-freedom/burton-v-florida.  For a discussion on courts’ error in applying Roe 
to override women’s medical decisions not related to abortion, see Cherry, supra note 46, at 728 (“The 
expansion of the state’s interest outside of the abortion context miscomprehends and diminishes the 
interest of the woman in her fetus and in her own health.”). 
 106 Burton, supra note 105. The Roe analogy is inadequate considering that the woman in Burton 
wanted to make a medical decision that was against her physician’s advice. Roe undeniably frames the 
right to abortion for women whose doctors agree with that medical treatment decision. The court in Roe 
said, “the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant 
woman’s attending physician[.]”  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 107 Id. at 178 n.7. 
 108 In addition to the tool of court-ordered cesarean surgery, states have violated women’s legal 
rights in childbirth by imposing child protective interventions on women who make their own decisions 
during childbirth.  In New Jersey, a woman eventually lost custody of her child after her refusal to pre-
authorize cesarean surgery—which was ultimately not needed—sparked concern about her mental well-
being and prompted hospital authorities to contact child welfare.  See N.J. Div. of Youth and Family 
Serv. v. V.M., 974 A.2d 448 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2009).  See also, Jessica Waters, In Whose Best 
Interest?  New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. V.M. and B.G. and the Next Wave of 
Court-Controlled Pregnancies, 34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 81 (2011). 
 109 Harvard Law Review, Rethinking Motherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of 
Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (1990) (“As . . . fetal endangerment and the urgency of state 
regulation increase, the legal analysis must shift from an assumption of conflict to an acknowledgment 
of the interdependence of the maternal-fetal relationship.”). 
 110 For example, Amendment 62 on the Colorado ballot in 2010 would have defined the term 
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constitutional rights of fully competent persons to make healthcare decisions 
related to childbirth serves to illustrate the unfinished work of securing women’s 
dignity and equality under the law. 
II. CHILDBIRTH OUTSIDE OF THE HOSPITAL: ACCESS TO MIDWIFERY CARE 
A. Introduction 
This Article argues that rather than remaining a glaring lacuna in feminist 
legal thought about reproductive rights and gender equality, birthing rights can be a 
point of convergence and growth for feminist legal scholars.  Section I of this essay 
reviewed the ways in which “clinical medicine is a venue rife with power 
relations”111 for birthing women; among those the relationship between the 
woman, her care provider and institution, and the state.  This Section expands the 
analysis to include the relevant power relations at play when women seek maternity 
care outside of the biomedical model,112 including midwifery.  It does not retell the 
history of midwifery or its regulation, but rather, sets guideposts to several points 
of analysis that could be a fruitful area of exploration for feminist legal scholars, in 
particular, efforts to expand access to Certified Professional Midwives (“CPMs”), 
who serve women outside of the hospital.113 
Support for midwives has been an area of focus for some feminist women’s 
health advocates114 and mainstream feminist organizations,115 and is understood as 
 
“person” in the Colorado Constitution “to include any human being from the beginning of the biological 
development of that human being.” Colorado Fetal Personhood, Amendment 62, Colo. Const. art. II, 
available at http://www.leg.state.co.us/LCS/Initiative%20Referendum/0910InitRefr.nsf/0/ 
ed0d797d3ffe6fb0872576f5005c1efd/$FILE/Amendment%2062.pdf (the measure was broadly 
defeated). 
 111 Hunter, Rights Talk, supra note 21, at 1535. 
 112 Throughout, I will use the term “biomedical” model to describe physician-led or hospital based 
maternity care for childbirth.  For a detailed description of the difference between practice models and 
underlying philosophies between biomedicine and midwifery, see Suzanne Hope Suarez, Midwifery is 
Not the Practice of Medicine, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 315 (1993). 
 113 According to the National Association of Certified Professional Midwives (“MACPM”), the 
professional organization of CPMs, these midwives “practice as autonomous health professionals 
working within a network of relationships with other maternity care professionals,” and follow The 
Midwives Model of Care, which is based on the fact that pregnancy and birth are normal life events.  
The Model of Care includes: “monitoring the physical, psychological and social well-being of the 
mother throughout the childbearing cycle; providing the mother with individualized education, 
counseling and prenatal care, continuous hands-on assistance during labor and delivery and postpartum 
support; minimizing technological interventions; and identifying and referring women who require 
obstetrical attention.”  NACPM, What is a Certified Professional Midwife?, 
http://www.nacpm.org/what-is-cpm.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2012). 
 114 See, e.g., Letters Respond to Lancet Home Birth Editorial With Feminist Perspective, OUR 
BODIES OURSELVES (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.ourbodiesourblog.org/blog/2010/10/letters-respond-to-
lancet-home-birth-editorial-with-feminist-perspective (responding to an editorial in British medical 
journal The Lancet, stating that “[w]omen have the right to choose how and where to give birth, but they 
do not have the right to put their baby at risk”). 
 115 1999 National Organization for Women Conference Resolution, cited in CRAVEN, supra note 6, 
at 28. 
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a critical part of the reproductive justice framework.116  Like some feminist 
scholarship, “reproductive justice draws attention to cultural and socio-economic 
inequalities because everyone does not have equal opportunity to participate in 
society’s cultural discourses.” 117  In discourses about pregnancy, this includes 
“public policy decisions based on cultural and economic values, such as abortion, 
midwifery and mothering.”118  Women seek alternatives to physician-directed 
maternity care for a variety of reasons ranging from personal safety and financial 
considerations to religious, cultural, and political beliefs.119  This is especially true 
for people who believe that the manner in which they give birth imparts deep 
meaning to their understanding of the world and their place within it.  Many 
women across the United States who wish to give birth outside of a hospital or 
utilize midwifery-led care find their options restricted, and as reproductive justice 
advocate Loretta Ross notes, not everyone has the opportunity to make these 
choices equally.120 
A recent Time magazine article about women who give birth at home draws a 
connection between the illegal status of midwives and restrictions on abortion, a 
parallel that seems obvious to some,121 but which has not made its way to the 
feminist legal academy.  The journalist begins with a common story occurring for 
women across the United States: 
When Hillary McLaughlin found out she was pregnant, she was unable to 
legally obtain the service she needed.  So she looked for an underground 
contact.  She got a woman’s name—just a first name—and a phone number 
from a friend who advised her to destroy the evidence as soon as she made 
the call.  When McLaughlin reached the woman, however, the woman told 
her she no longer “did that” and that she wasn’t willing to risk going to jail 
for it anymore.  Turned off by all the “whisper, whisper, cloak-and-dagger 
stuff,” McLaughlin decided to “jump state lines” from Illinois to Missouri 
 
 116 See, e.g., Luz Reproductive Justice Think Tank Manifesta (last visited Sept. 19, 2012), 
http://www.luzthinktank.org/luzmanifesto (“We defend access to family planning, comprehensive sex 
education, and the right to determine the course of pregnancy and method of childbirth should be 
available for all people at all stages of life.”); see also, Farah Diaz-Tello & Lynn Paltrow, NAPW 
Working Paper: Birth Justice as Reproductive Justice January 2010 Draft, available at 
www.advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/BirthJusticeasReproRights.pdf. 
 117 Loretta J. Ross, Understanding Reproductive Justice: Transforming the Pro-Choice Movement, 
at 10 (2006), available at http://www.sistersong.net/reproductive_justice.html. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See Debora Boucher et al., Staying Home to Give Birth: Why Women in the United States Choose 
Home Birth, 54 J. MIDWIFERY & WOMEN’S HEALTH 119 (2009); Melissa J. Cheyney, Homebirth as 
Systems-Challenging Praxis: Knowledge, Power, and Intimacy in the Birthplace, 18 QUAL. HEALTH 
RES. 254 (2008). 
 120 Ross, supra note 117. 
 121 Anne Bartow, Midwives and Home Births, FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS BLOG (Apr. 3, 2006), 
www.feministlawprofessors.com/2006/04/midwives-and-home-births (“It is fairly simple to make 
connections between the regulation of midwifery and home birthing with other reproductive freedom 
issues like abortion[.]”).  The post from which this quote was taken links to a 2006 New York Times 
article about midwifery.  The post is one of only three posts relating to midwives or midwifery on the 
blog, none of which were academic articles on the subject. 
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to find a legal provider. 122 
The subject of the story was seeking not an abortion, but a midwife to attend 
the home delivery of her baby in Illinois, a state where the practice of midwifery 
without a nursing license is illegal.  In states where midwives are legally 
authorized to practice, they do not provide home birth services, and in states where 
the demand outstrips their capacity to provide services, women like Hillary 
McLaughlin have few options.  Before Roe, feminists observed that illegal abortion 
in the United States posed threats to individual liberties as well as the public’s 
health, and the same is true for midwifery.123  Restricting women’s ability to hire a 
midwife to attend out-of-hospital childbirth requires women to resort to 
underground maternity care for which there is no quality control mechanism, other 
than the criminal justice system, and for which women have faced reprisal from the 
state.124  Hillary’s ability to seek out and find an underground contact speaks to her 
social and informational privilege; her ability to go to another state gives some 
indication of access to economic resources. 
Barriers to care include legal restrictions on the practice of midwifery and 
insurance restrictions on reimbursement for midwifery services.125  Currently, 
thirty-three states require private insurance reimbursement for midwives, but often 
only for nurse-midwives practicing in the hospital setting.126  Where midwives 
practice illegally, most women are required to pay for their services out-of-pocket, 
typically between $2,000 and $5,000.  Some private insurance will reimburse for 
the care provided by an unlicensed midwife, but Medicaid will not.  Therefore, 
women who are unable to pay for care out of pocket do not have the option of 
receiving care from a midwife. 
B. Politics, Patients, and Legal Access to Midwives 
Reproductive justice demands that all pregnant people have an equal 
opportunity to make and exercise decisions about their care, including out-of-
hospital birth.  While no state regulates the location where a woman must give 
birth, all states have the power to license and regulate health professionals who 
attend birth as a component of state police power.127  Historically and currently, 
states have exercised regulatory power over midwives in a variety of ways, thereby 
 
 122 Catharine Elton, American Women: Birthing Babies at Home, TIME (Sept. 4, 2010), available at 
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2011940,00.html. 
 123 This analogy does not intend to diminish the essay’s earlier argument about the misapplication of 
the state interest in fetal life stated by abortion law to birthing rights, but rather to draw a parallel to the 
public health implications of prohibitions against abortion and midwifery. 
 124 See discussion, infra Part II.B. 
 125 Deadly Delivery, supra note 17, at 81. 
 126 Id. 
 127 LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 254 (2000) (“In 
addition to licensing and regulating health care professionals such as physicians, nurses, dentists, and 
pharmacists, states license professionals such as barbers, electricians, morticians and plumbers who 
engage in trades that affect public health and safety.”). 
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controlling the conditions under which some women experience childbirth.128  
Currently, Certified Professional Midwives legally authorized to practice in twenty-
seven states,129 and there are campaigns underway in other states to increase that 
number.  For example, The Big Push for Midwives Campaign was launched in 
2007 with the mission “to educate state and national policymakers about the 
reduced costs and improved outcomes associated with out-of-hospital maternity 
care and to advocate for expanding access to the services of Certified Professional 
Midwives, who are specially trained to provide it.”130  Many of these advocates 
have taken a legislative route to expand access to midwifery care, arguing that 
“unless proponents can convince skeptical courts that midwifery is a fundamental 
constitutional right, prompting strict scrutiny of state regulations restricting its 
availability, activists should focus on convincing legislatures that independent 
licensing of midwifery is in the best interests of the state.”131  These legislative 
efforts are a pitched battle between midwifery supporters and foes. 
Numerous courts have been asked and have declined to protect a woman’s 
right to midwife-attended birth as a fundamental constitutional right.  In Bowland v. 
Municipal Court, a midwife was prosecuted for violating a California law 
forbidding unlicensed individuals from attending women in childbirth.132  The 
midwife asserted that her client’s privacy right “encompasses the liberty to choose 
whomever she wants to assist in the delivery of her child.”133  The Supreme Court 
of California found that while the right to privacy protects “certain personal choices 
related to childrearing, marriage, procreation and abortion,” Roe v. Wade 
specifically excludes the woman’s right to decide the manner and circumstances 
under which her child is born.134  Unlike the courts in the compelled cesarean cases 
discussed earlier, the Bowland court correctly characterized the holding of Roe v. 
Wade, noting that the state’s interest in viable fetal life gives the state the power to 
 
 128 Several types of midwives currently practice in the United States.  Certified Nurse-Midwives are 
licensed to practice in every state, although with varying degrees of professional autonomy and 
physician supervision.  Nurse-midwives become certified by first completing nursing credentials, 
followed by graduate level training in midwifery. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF NURSE-MIDWIVES, 
www.midwife.org/program_types (last visited Sept. 4, 2012).  Many nurse-midwives practice in hospital 
settings, others in freestanding birth centers, and others in women’s homes, or a combination of 
locations. This article focuses on Certified Professional Midwives, who enter the profession of 
midwifery directly and not through nursing. Id. 
 129 THE BIG PUSH FOR MIDWIVES, http://www.pushformidwives.org (last visited Sept. 4, 2012). 
 130 Id.  The Big Push for Midwives is comprised of state-level organizations such as the North 
Carolina Friends of Midwives, http://ncfom.org/; Friends of Michigan Midwives, 
www.friendsofmichiganmidwives.org; Ohio Families for Safe Birth, http://safebirthohio.org; Alabama 
Birth Coalition, www.alabamabirthcoalition.org; Indiana Midwifery Task Force, 
www.indianamidwiferytaskforce.org; South Dakota Safe Childbirth Options, www.sdsafebirth.org; and 
Illinois Coalition for Midwifery, www.illinoismidwifery.org. 
 131 Suarez, supra note 112, at 358-59. 
 132 Bowland v. Mun. Ct., 18 Cal.3d 479 (Cal. 1976). 
 133 Id. at 494. 
 134 Id. at 495. 
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proscribe the performance of abortions.135  Nevertheless, the court misapplied the 
result, finding that Roe recognized a state interest in the “life and well being of an 
unborn child” that permitted a legislative policy decision to require that childbirth 
attendants hold valid licenses.136  Courts in Maryland,137 Massachusetts,138 and 
Colorado139 have also considered and rejected the argument that the right to 
privacy extends to a woman’s right to choose whomever she wishes to attend her in 
childbirth, such as an unlicensed midwife. 
State regulatory power over midwives can promote reproductive justice or it 
can introduce barriers to access.  Over-regulation of midwives demonstrates one 
way in which regulation can create problems related to social and economic justice 
because licensure “parcels out authority based upon the discretion of officials” who 
may exercise this discretion in a discriminatory fashion.140  In the early 1900s, 
registration and licensure of midwives has been documented as a part of efforts to 
eliminate midwifery;141 many of the efforts were fueled and reinforced by race- 
and class-based prejudices against women of color and immigrant midwives.142  In 
her exploration of midwifery regulation, Professor Stacey Tovino highlights 
decisions across several states in which courts deferred to legislative findings—
motivated by physicians attempting to eliminate midwifery—to justify stringent 
regulation of midwives and to uphold physician supervision of midwifery 
practice.143  Noting these concerns, some scholars have suggested that state 
regulation of midwives “formalizes the dominance of physicians over them” to the 
detriment of the profession and the women it serves.144  Beyond explicitly 
outlawing midwifery practice, administrative agencies and legislatures have shown 
preference for the biomedical model, showing the way in which “birth and 
approaches to birth, both conventional—i.e., hospital—and alternative—i.e., home 
birth and midwifery—are now interpreted within the framework of what 
obstetricians consider ‘safe’ for the fetus, for the parturient woman, and in a 
liability sense, for themselves.”145  Privileging of the biomedical model as the best 
protector of public health is not exclusive to midwifery, but rather is a part of “a 
long, checkered history of both public-mindedness and protectionism” of physician 
 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Hunter v. Maryland, 676 A.2d 968 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (finding that reference to privacy 
interests articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut did not apply to the right to choose a midwife). 
 138 Leigh v. Bd. of Registration in Nursing, 506 N.E.2d 91 (Mass. 1987). 
 139 Colorado v. Rosburg, 805 P.2d 432, 437 (Colo. 1991). 
 140 GOSTIN, supra note 127, at 255. 
 141 See DEVRIES, supra note 7. 
 142 CRAVEN, supra note 6, at 61. 
 143 Stacey A. Tovino, American Midwifery Litigation and State Legislative Preference for 
Physician-Controlled Childbirth, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 61 (2004). 
 144 DEVRIES, supra note 7, at 140. 
 145 Chris Hafner-Eaton & Laurie K. Pearce, Birth Choices, the Law, and Medicine: Balancing 
Individual Freedoms and Protection of the Public’s Health, 19 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 813, 816 
(1994). 
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control over health policy.146 
Physician control of health policymaking is beginning to change in the 
United States, and experts predict that patient participation will only continue to 
amplify this trend.147  Midwifery clients, who see themselves as co-creators of their 
care, have taken on a political identity in pursuit of better maternity care.148  In 
Pushing for Midwives: Homebirth Mothers and the Reproductive Rights Movement, 
anthropologist Christa Craven describes how movements to secure access to 
midwives in recent years have both paralleled and been at odds with the broader 
reproductive rights movement.149  According to her analysis, the history of 
struggles to gain access to safe, dignified care during childbirth reveals much 
disparity in the ways that women from different race, class, religious and 
socioeconomic groups experienced and continue to experience maternity care in the 
United States.150 
Professor Craven’s book recounts recent efforts to license and regulate CPMs 
in Virginia, showing how organizers were successful in legislative campaigns by 
casting access to midwifery as a “consumer rights” issue.  Consumerism, though, 
“both fails to capture what is unique about the experience of health care and also 
implicitly cabins individual agency and responsibility to market-related 
interactions.”151  Those who can participate in the market can participate in the 
choice of a midwife.  Craven posits that feminist scholars have an important role to 
play in evaluating this strategy as it pertains to reproductive justice by exploring its 
potential negative consequences “for the very women it seeks to liberate.”152  
Feminist legal scholars also bear this responsibility because law plays a central role 
in health policy. 
Because privileging of the biomedical model reinforces physician control in 
healthcare policymaking,153 it is not surprising that medical authorities have 
mounted a strong opposition to midwifery consumer efforts.  In 2008, the 
American Medical Association issued a statement calling for model legislation “in 
 
 146 William M. Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and the Widening Gap Between 
Individual Health Law and Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J. 497, 498-99 (2008) (discussing 
physician response to the “partial birth” abortion ban, and mandatory insurance coverage for post-
childbirth hospitalization–i.e., “drive-through delivery” laws–as well as routine coverage for 
mammography for women in their forties). 
 147 See Hunter, Rights Talk, supra note 21. 
 148 It is neither possible nor correct, however, to characterize their movement as universally 
feminist.  Midwifery supporters claim a diversity of political and religious beliefs.  Some have strong 
anti-abortion sentiment based in Christian ideals; others identify as liberal feminists committed to 
women’s choice and control over reproduction. Craven writes: “Delayed concern over women’s rights 
during childbirth is in part why many homebirth [mothers] distanced themselves from the feminist 
movement for reproductive rights.” CRAVEN, supra note 6, at 48. 
 149 Id. at 2. 
 150 Id. at 25. 
 151 Hunter, Rights Talk, supra note 21, at 1525. 
 152 CRAVEN, supra note 6, at 3. 
 153 Sage, supra note 146, at 2. 
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support of the concept that the safest setting for labor, delivery, and the immediate 
post-partum period is in the hospital, or a birthing center within a hospital complex 
. . . or in a freestanding birthing center,” without any evidence to back up the 
claim.154  The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ (ACOG) 
statement on home births declares that “[u]nless a woman is in a hospital, an 
accredited freestanding birthing center, or a birthing center within a hospital 
complex, with physicians ready to intervene quickly if necessary, she puts herself 
and her baby’s health and life at unnecessary risk,” and that choosing to give birth 
at home “is to place the process of giving birth over the goal of having a healthy 
baby.”155  The statement further asserts that ACOG does not support the provision 
of maternity care by certain midwife providers.156  Taken together, these 
statements and policies could be used to curtail a woman’s right to choose the 
location and provider for childbirth.157 
Professor Tovino’s research about the treatment of midwives in court 
opinions identifies the potential race, class and gender-based motivations of 
legislative and judicial deference to physician controlled childbirth, particularly 
various courts’ disdain for the positive health outcomes that midwives can achieve 
for women and babies in their care.158  She concludes that such deference 
“suggests that the women midwives’ experiential knowledge was both subordinate 
to the male physician’s . . . scientific knowledge and rejected as a means of 
 
 154 Clarence S. Avery, Jr., MD, Memorial Resolutions: Section 205 House Deliveries (2008), AMA 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/hod/a08resolutions.pdf. 
 155 ACOG Statement on Home Births, ACOG OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS (Feb. 2008), 
www.acog.org/from_home/publications/press_releases/nr02-06-08-2.cfm. 
 156 Id. 
 157 This prediction is more than alarmist conjecture: Laura Pemberton planned a homebirth with a 
midwife and was physically abducted from her home and returned to the hospital for a cesarean. See 
supra Section I.  For an interesting analysis of Pemberton, see Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible 
Woman: Availability and Culpability in Reproductive Health Jurisprudence, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 
144 (2010).  The author argues that the court found Pemberton culpable for the lack of VBAC services 
she desired, allowing the court to truncate her health interest. Pemberton, however, was not seeking 
VBAC services at the hospital.  She desired a home birth with a midwife. 
Some states have enforced their views of appropriate decision-making in childbirth with regard to the 
choice of a maternity care provider through the intervention of child protective services.  Authorities in 
Illinois recently removed a baby from the custody of a mother after she gave birth at home with the 
assistance of a midwife, citing medical neglect, because a physician had previously recommended 
cesarean section. See Jennifer Lance, CPS Removes Illinois Baby Because of Home Birth “Medical 
Neglect” (Sept. 15, 2010), http://ecochildsplay.com/2010/09/15/cps-removes-illinois-baby-because-of-
home-birth-medical-neglect.  In that case, both mother and child were healthy but the family decided to 
seek medical assistance to check up on the child after birth. Id.  Other states have criminally charged 
women who deliver babies outside of the hospital with child endangerment.  In Ohio, the mother and 
father of the Levier family were charged with neglect after the mother gave birth at home, albeit to a 
healthy baby. See Kathy Jacobson, Ohio Family Facing Prosecution for Home Birth; Healthy Baby, 
Healthy Mom, TRANSITION IN ACTION SOCIAL NETWORK BLOG (Sept. 29, 2009, 5:15 PM), 
http://transitioninaction.com/profiles/blog/show?id=2320371%3ABlogPost%3A30889&commentId=23
20371%3AComment%3A31765&xg_source=activity.  The parents posted an online plea for help and 
support, stating, “It’s time for us to stand up for our rights as women, parents and law abiding citizens 
who don’t want the government trampling on our rights to live and raise our families as we choose!” Id. 
 158 Tovino, supra note 143, at 106. 
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establishing professional and legal standing.”159  This observation parallels the way 
that courts treat individual women’s choices in childbirth in cases like Pemberton, 
discussed in Part I.160 The structural framework Professor Hill proposes applies 
well to the birthing rights issues discussed herein:161 women’s rights to make 
medical decisions regarding childbirth, and the state’s role in protecting public 
health by making safe birthing choices available, are both fundamentally questions 
of whether and how the law protects the right to make autonomous treatment 
decisions.  In evaluating midwifery laws, those factors have included race, class, 
and gender classifications.162  Explicit or implicit use of gender and race 
stereotypes by the courts and legislatures should spark feminist interest and 
examination, and could fit squarely into casebooks on the topic. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article proposes that feminist lawyers can and must play a part in 
developing a robust conception of reproductive justice that includes birthing 
women, centering and prioritizing the needs of those with the least access to 
reproductive freedom.  Over-reliance on medical authority both by the courts and 
by state legislatures, and the misapplication of abortion precedent seem to be the 
two fundamental obstacles towards women enjoying meaningful birthing rights.  
One of the ways feminist jurisprudence can play its part is by asking its students 
critical questions about these issues, and teaching them to make connections 
between policy, advocacy, strategy and scholarship.  For these reasons, birthing 
rights should be included in academic discussions about gender equality and 
reproductive rights law. 
 
 
 159 Id. 
 160 Supra Part I.B.  Specifically, see the court’s dismissal of Laura Pemberton’s presentation of 
alternative medical evidence regarding the risks and benefits of cesarean section. Id. 
 161 Hill, supra note 22, at 277. 
 162 Tovino, supra note 143, at 105 (suggesting that if attorneys arguing against a law that effectively 
outlawed midwifery practice in Alabama had highlighted the disparate impact that the law had on black 
midwives, the outcome of the case may have preserved midwifery practice). 
